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NSA review completed



**Nineteenth Report**

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF  
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS**

**(This report covers the week from  
22 June through 28 June 1973)**

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the  
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense*

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## Nineteenth Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF  
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS\*

(This report covers the week from  
22 June through 28 June 1973)

The Key Points

- A small group of North Vietnamese artillery personnel (about 70 men) was observed beginning the infiltration trip toward southern Laos during the week. In addition, about 100 non-combat specialists were also observed in the infiltration pipeline.
- North Vietnamese logistic activity in southern Laos is now nearly at a standstill, although heavy NVA logistic traffic continues in northern South Vietnam and moderate activity continues in the North Vietnamese Panhandle.
- Combat activity was at a low level in South Vietnam. It was also low in most areas of Laos, except around Thakhek where Communist forces launched several battalion-size attacks over a four day period.

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The Details

NOTE: This is the nineteenth in a series of reports detailing recently received evidence of (a) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, and (b) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements.

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A. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel

1. One new combat infiltration group was observed in the infiltration pipeline during the past week. This group, containing 71 artillery personnel and moving with ten 122-mm field artillery pieces, probably departed North Vietnam after the 15 June effective date of the Paris "Communique." It is headed for southern Laos, and the ten artillery pieces were observed on 26 June on Route 91 northwest of Tchepone. This group, and one other artillery group noted in our report of last week, may have been originally scheduled to leave North Vietnam in late 1972, but apparently were delayed until recently for unknown reasons.

2. In addition, eight small groups of civil and military specialists, totalling about 100 men, were also noted for the first time moving south in the pipeline during the week. Since 27 January, a total of some 51,000 North Vietnamese personnel have infiltrated into South Vietnam and its adjacent border areas--26,000 who started south since then and 25,000 who were in the pipeline as of that date. (ANNEX II, [redacted] contains a more detailed discussion of the information pertaining to infiltration which was received during the past week.)

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3. Newly received information indicates that the headquarters of two regimental-size North Vietnamese units--one a logistics unit and the other an AAA regiment--recently entered the northern half of South Vietnam from Laos and Cambodia. The headquarters of the logistics unit was identified on 20 June in the A Shau Valley of Thua Thien Province, east of its former location in Saravane Province of southern Laos. Also, as of 21 June the headquarters of the NVA 46th AAA Regiment had relocated from northeastern Cambodia into Pleiku Province of South Vietnam. The deployment of these two units is further evidence of North Vietnam's continuing emphasis on increasing its logistical and air defense capabilities along the new supply corridor in western South Vietnam.

4. Last week we reported that a company of an NVA engineering battalion apparently was withdrawing from northern Laos to North Vietnam. Later information now indicates that the entire engineering battalion may be redeploying from the Plaine Des Jarres area to North Vietnam. Such a move would represent the first instance this year of the withdrawal of an NVA unit of battalion size from northern Laos.

B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies Through and Into Laos and South Vietnam

5. North Vietnamese logistic activity in southern Laos is now nearly at a standstill, although construction work continues on selected sections of the road network. In northern South Vietnam resupply traffic continued at a heavy pace during the week as NVA units there sustained the previously reported "transportation campaign." Heavy vehicle activity was observed throughout the area, particularly in the supply corridor extending from the DMZ to the A Shau Valley. Logistic activity in southern North Vietnam also continued to be moderately heavy, with some of the resupply movements being directed toward northern Laos.

6. The following instances of Communist logistic activity were observed in South Vietnam during the period. Activity observed in South Vietnam

[redacted]

probably reflects supplies which have recently entered the country. (The map on the following page shows the roads and route numbers which appear below.)

a.) [redacted] by the end of June the North Vietnamese will probably have completed construction of a petroleum storage and receiving facility capable of storing almost 300 metric tons of POL at a location 10 miles northwest of Quang Tri City. The new facility is at the terminus of the four-inch-diameter military pipeline constructed across the DMZ from North Vietnam in April 1972. The NVA has also been strengthening its POL resupply system in other areas of northern MR 1 in recent months. (ANNEX III, [redacted] contains additional details on this development.)

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b.) [redacted] 88 cargo vehicles were detected on Route 548 north of A Shau (42 northbound, 13 southbound, 33 parked.)

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c.) [redacted] 68 cargo trucks were observed on Route 9 between the Laos/South Vietnam border and the route's junction with Route 6088 (8 eastbound, 23 westbound, 37 parked.)

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d.) [redacted] 11 cargo vehicles were parked on a feeder route running north from Route 9 west of Dong Ha.


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e.) [redacted] 150 cargo vehicles were observed along Route 548 north of A Shau (59 northbound, 29 southbound, 62 parked.)

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f.) [redacted] 64 cargo trucks were on Route 9 between the Laos/South Vietnam border and the intersection with

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Route 6088 (16 eastbound, 14 westbound, 34 parked.) On the same date, 12 cargo vehicles were observed on Route 6089 south of Khe Sanh (1 northbound, 2 southbound, 9 parked.)

7. During the reporting period the following indications of North Vietnamese logistic activity in southern Laos were noted. Historical precedent suggests that much of this activity probably involved supplies destined for South Vietnam.

- a.) The table below lists observed NVA vehicle activity on selected routes in the Laos Panhandle during the reporting period.\*

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	<u>Route 99</u>	<u>Route 9211</u>	<u>Route 958</u>
	0	NC	0
	NC	NC	NC
	NC	NC	NC
	NC	NC	NC
	NC	NC	NC
	2 (1-N)	0	NC
	2 (1-N,1-S)	0	NC

\* The first number in each entry is the total number of vehicles. Of these totals, the number of trucks moving north (N) or south (S) are noted in the parentheses after each total. The remainder of the vehicles detected were parked along the roadway. "NC" indicates no coverage.

- b.) Construction and repair activity was observed at numerous points on the

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[redacted]

road network in the Laos Panhandle as the North Vietnamese continue their efforts to upgrade the logistic system there. [redacted] an estimated 50 miles of this work are currently in progress, the distance comprising a number of segments over the length of the Panhandle. The activity consists primarily of widening, straightening and upgrading the drainage capabilities of existing roads.

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- c.) In northern Laos, an NVA logistic unit operating on Route 7 at the Laos/North Vietnam border had almost 700 tons of foodstuffs and 70 tons of gasoline in storage [redacted]. This unit receives supplies from Vinh and transships them to NVA tactical units operating in the Plaines des Jarres region of North Laos.

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8. There is additional evidence of the continuing movement within North Vietnam of military and other supplies probably destined for South Vietnam and northern and southern Laos.

- a.) [redacted] over 170 tons of ammunition, comprising primarily small arms rounds, were transferred between two storage facilities in the Vinh area.
- b.) [redacted] 16 tons of explosives and 2 tons of gasoline were dispatched from a logistic unit near Vinh for delivery to northern Laos via Route 7.
- c.) [redacted] 36 northbound and 65 southbound cargo vehicles were observed crossing a ferry on the Troc River near Quang Khe. [redacted] 84 vehicles crossed at the same point; however, their direction of movement could not be determined.

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d.) [ ] an NVA logistic unit operating near Vinh received 29 tons of assorted rocket and mortar ammunition. On the same date, another unit in the same area reportedly received 11 vehicles carrying an undetermined amount of 57-mm antiaircraft ammunition.

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e.) [ ] a storage facility in the Vinh area received 18 tons of rocket and heavy artillery ammunition.

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C. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces in South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire

9. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January and for the last week (22-28 June) are shown below:

<u>Military Region</u>	<u>Total Since Ceasefire Level of Action</u>		<u>Last Week (22-28 June) Level of Action</u>	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	1,056	3,506	6	53
MR 2	284	2,033	6	107
MR 3	419	2,762	10	70
MR 4	733	6,665	15	180
Totals	2,492	14,966	37(86) <u>1/</u>	410(601) <u>1/</u>

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.


10. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the chart on the following page, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular

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# CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(28 JANUARY 1973 TO THE PRESENT)



time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion. In some cases, the Joint Military Commission (GVN/PRG) also reports violations of the ceasefire.

11. The following is a chronological listing of only the most significant "major" Communist violations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during the past week.

MILITARY REGION 1

a.) No significant activity.

MILITARY REGION 2

a.) No significant activity.

MILITARY REGION 3

a.) No significant activity.

MILITARY REGION 4

- a.) On 23 June, an ARVN unit 10 miles south of Vi Thanh received a ground attack.
- b.) On 25 June, eight miles southeast of Rach Gia and 12 miles east of Vi Thanh, ARVN forces received ground attacks.

D. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces in Laos During the Week from 22 through 28 June 1973

12. Except for intensified activity in Lao Military Region 3 (the central Panhandle), Communist-initiated combat remained at a low level. In MR 3, however, Communist units near Thakhek carried out a series of attacks between 23 and 26 June against government troops in the area. Several of the attacks were of battalion-size, and resulted in the withdrawal of some company-size units of the government side a few kilometers from previously held positions.

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## ANNEX II

Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North  
Vietnamese Personnel to the South

1. One regular infiltration group -- 5058 -- destined for southern Laos and previously included in the infiltration estimate was detected in the pipeline on 24 June. This group, with a reported strength of 71, is artillery-associated and is believed to be a part of a block of such groups that moved to the Laotian Panhandle in late 1972. As was the case with Group 5059 (on which we reported last week), the delayed movement of Group 5058 cannot be explained at this time.

2. Eight small groups comprised of about 100 civilian and military specialists also were detected during the past week. Five of these groups are destined for the COSVN area, while three others are traveling towards MR Tri-Thien-Hue in northern MR 1. As shown in the following table, three of the eight groups were observed entering the pipeline at Binh Tram 18 in North Vietnam; the other five, which probably started south prior to 15 June, were detected farther south in the system.

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Infiltration Groups Initially Reported  
During the Past Week

<u>Group Designator</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date of Detection</u>
5058	71	South Laos/SVN	24 June
QL 204	Unknown	South Laos	24 June
QL 407	4	North Vietnam	27 June
QL 408	4	North Vietnam	27 June
Y 207	11	Cambodia	19 June
Y 208	13	Cambodia	19 June
Y 209	9	Cambodia	19 June
Z 214	Unknown	South Laos	25 June
102	3	North Vietnam	27 June

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## ANNEX III

Development of NVA Petroleum Resupply Facilities  
in Northern South Vietnam

1. North Vietnam's capacity to supply POL to northern South Vietnam has been appreciably upgraded since the 27 January signing of the Vietnam settlement agreement. The reliability and efficiency of the NVA's pipeline system in the area has been improved, and temporary storage facilities have been replaced with permanent depots.

2. Communist forces in northern MR 1 receive most of their POL from North Vietnam through a four-inch diameter pipeline constructed through the DMZ in April 1972. NVA forces in the A Shau Valley, however, have been supplied by a branch pipeline extending eastward from the main North Vietnam-Laos pipeline, and another branch pipeline has also been built--apparently since 27 January--from the Chavane area of southern Laos eastward into South Vietnam. In addition to the POL storage facility northwest of Quang Tri City (discussed in Paragraph 6(a) of this report), two additional POL installations, one near Khe Sanh and the other in the A Shau Valley, are under construction or have been recently completed. A truck refueling depot with a capacity of about 20 metric tons has been completed adjacent to Route 9, two miles south of Khe Sanh airfield. The Communists will probably extend a spur-pipeline into this area from their main pipeline in Laos or from the line which crosses the DMZ to the east. In the A Shau Valley, a 200 metric ton storage facility is now under construction near Route 548. The construction of such permanent facilities is additional evidence that the North Vietnamese Army intends to remain in these areas indefinitely.



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